

**The Leslie Prince Memorial Lecture
Of the Anglo-Jewish Association
Given by General Sir Rupert Smith**

Your Excellencies, Lords, ladies and gentlemen, I'm Michael Hilsenrath. I'm the President of the Anglo-Jewish Association and it is a pleasure to have you all here with us for this year's Leslie Prince Memorial Lecture which will be given by General Sir Rupert Smith. Before I introduce the General there are some administrative matters we have to deal with. I'd also like to tell you all a little bit about the AJA and Leslie Prince and then thank a number of people without whom none of us wouldn't be here this evening, quite frankly. The administration is first of all; please switch off your mobile phones - which includes me. If there is an absolute necessity to have it on we'd all appreciate if you would turn it to silent mode so that if it should go off it won't disturb the General while he's giving the lecture. The second bit of the administration is the format of the evening. The General will speak. He will take questions for quite frankly as long as he's happy to. We'll close the evening with a vote of thanks and if there's time there will be drinks and some refreshments afterwards for a bit of chat.

The evening is hosted by the Anglo Jewish Association along with the Clemens Nathan Research Centre. The Anglo-Jewish Association is a charity of longstanding in the UK. We were founded in 1871 and our principal activity is to provide financial support to Jewish students who are studying in institutes of higher education in the UK. Last year we supported about 100 students and we provided about £100,000 in direct aid to them. The evening is called the Leslie Prince Memorial Lecture, and Leslie Prince – it's actually quite appropriate that we're here. Leslie Prince has a long relationship with the Anglo-Jewish Association. He was a member. He was very involved on the Executive. He was very involved in the Anglo-Jewish community in charitable causes with the CBF during the Second World War and a number of other organisations. But also Leslie Prince was very involved in the City and in fact he was the Sheriff of London as well as being a member of the Corporation. I must extend apologies from Michael Prince – Leslie's son – who can't be with us here this evening. Michael has continually supported the AJA as well as and specifically the Leslie Prince Memorial Lecture. Without Michael's generosity to

the organisation and events like this, we wouldn't be able to hold them. I'm sorry he's not here with us. He does send his apologies and we hope that our association with the Prince family which is decades old, continues for a very long time to come.

I mention that I owe thanks to a lot of people and I would just like to take a bit of time to go through that list. First of all I would like to thank David Jacobs who is a member of our Executive. David was determined to make contact with General Smith and did everything he needed to including sandbagging him, if I can use that phrase, at one of his lectures to invite him to talk to us, and it's because of David and obviously because of the General agreeing that we're here this evening. So David, thank you very much. Two other people I'd like to thank are also members of the Executive, Julia Samuel who unfortunately can't be with us here this evening and Michael Newman who is here. Between the two of them they were responsible for a lot of the publicity tonight which has brought all of you to the event as well as handing over the administrative side as far as dealing with the acceptances, handling management and organising the venue itself. So I'd like to thank them as well. I'd also like to thank the Clemens Nathan Research Centre who are our co-hosts this evening and Clemens Nathan as well who is here with us. Clemens is a member of the Executive; he is the current Vice President and past President and obviously a very strong supporter of the Anglo-Jewish Association. The Clemens Nathan Research Centre hosts a number of their own events here and I would like to digress just a bit and let you know about their next conference which is covering International Development and Foreign Policy which will be held here on the 5th of November. There are some fliers out in the back. If anyone picked them up, it would be fantastic if you attended. If you're interested, hopefully there are some more fliers left at the end as you exit the venue tonight.

I guess – oh sorry – and I also must thank the CST. There are 2 members of the CST who've been walking around the venue this evening. Hopefully most of you haven't noticed them. But the CST is one of those organisations who provide security at events like these gratis and it's a thankless task in some respects. Often I suspect it happens without them being thanked and I would like to make a special mention here this evening and thank them very much for all your efforts for us this evening.

The last person who I need to thank is General Smith. And... since publishing his book...I've done a bit of research on the internet and since publishing his book it seems that the General has been giving lectures and giving interviews for

organisations like us as well as for very high brow, high powered defence organisations, and sitting on panels with people like Xavier Solana. If I ... At the same time he's also managed to get himself onto a national television show in the United States, on the Comedy Channel. So I'm not quite sure how the juxtaposition of those two go but it does give you an idea of the interest in the General's theories.

If I understand what the General is putting forward he says that conventional war no longer exists but violence flourishes, and we no longer fight wars between states, but amongst the people. And the big issue as far as General Smith is concerned although as I understand it, is that Government and the Armed Forces haven't realised that this change has taken place. As someone else summarised this, and unfortunately I can't quote the source, but it's not mine, in other words 'War aint what it used to be, and the challenge is that we need to adjust our old mind-set and accept what the current MO is.'

For the past few weeks the Jewish community has been celebrating the New Year. It has – the period of 3 weeks has ended with the Festival of Tabernacles. And there is a custom in some of the synagogues during the Feast of Tabernacles, to read from the book of Ecclesiastes. I suspect the most famous verse from Ecclesiastes is 'For everything there is a season' that was made famous by a band called the Byrds I believe in the 1960s. I can't tell you that I know that for a fact of course but that's what someone told me. And there are a few verses in there which I think actually are quite appropriate for tonight. One verse goes 'a generation comes and a generation goes, but the earth endures forever.' And there is a second verse which is the end of the whole stream of 'to everything there is a season' – 'a time for war and a time for peace.' The two are linked in the following way, I think, and they are very appropriate for tonight. Commentators explain the first verse to me in the following, that the reason nothing changes is that we do not learn from the experiences of the past and the verse that 'there is a time for war and a time for peace' is designed to teach us that before we go to war we need to make sure that we put in place everything that's required for the peace which comes afterwards. Or as perhaps the General argues we've not learnt the lessons of the wars that we have fought since World War II. And he goes on to say that force should only be used when there is a clear understanding of the objective. In other words 'Don't fight the war unless you've planned for what the outcome is or rather for the outcome that you are trying to achieve.' The 3,000 year old warnings from Ecclesiastes are just as relevant today when they're being

repeated by General Smith. I would ask you all to give a very, very warm welcome to General Sir Rupert Smith.

(Applause)

Thank you very much indeed, and if I knew my Old Testament a bit better I might try and follow that, but I won't. I must start by declaring that in the front row here is Ilana Bet-El who is my partner. She is... had a very, very large part in why this book has been written at all and in the way it was written, how it was written, and so forth. The most you'd have got out of me is a small military pamphlet sitting on some shelf somewhere. And if I get stuck for answers to any questions, you will see me glance them down to the front row here, later on.

I'll talk for about 40 minutes and then I'm wide open to questions. I will be using the examples or examples drawn from the events of last year astride the Israel-Lebanon border, as a set of examples of what I'm talking about. But if you want to take the questions off to Iraq or Afghanistan, or some other event, then by all means do. I'll have a go at answering them.

The talk falls into 3 sections. There is my assertion that there has been this change in the face or paradigm of war, and that our institutions are unsuited to conduct the new form of war because they've all developed to manage the previous one. And I shall illustrate some of the characteristics of this new form of war with examples from the war of last summer. And then make some brief suggestions of where we need to look for, not so much the answers, but the changes we must make.

Now it is my contention, argued in *The Utility of Force* which is on sale outside and I will cheerfully sign for anyone who has bought, that the nature of operations today and in the future is fundamentally of a different nature to those of the past and for which our institutions have developed to conduct successfully, and I this form or model of war, 'war amongst the people' in contrast to the past – industrial war. The essential difference between the two is that military force is no longer used to decide the matter. It is used to create a condition in which the strategic result is achieved by other means. The strategic object being to alter the opponent's intentions, rather than to destroy him. As a result, we do not move in that nice linear way as described in the Old Testament of Peace, Crisis, War, Resolution, Peace. That is what our institutions have grown up to manage. Now we're in a world of continuous

confrontations and conflicts in which the military acts in the conflict support the achievement of the desired outcome to the confrontation by other means. Now when I talk of institutions I am referring to the institutions of governance, whether those be of Whitehall, or Tel Aviv, whether they be Parliamentary, or Administrative, and whether they are national or inter-governmental. I refer to the executive institutions, of the diplomatic, the intelligence, the armed forces, the development services and the multinational organisations that we form from elements of these. And finally, I refer to the defence industries. And linking all of these institutions are processes, relationships and authorities that bring them into a whole. I am not except in general terms, referring to particular weapons or equipments or organisations. If we are to change, to recognise this change in the face of war then we must understand the complexity of what we are about and the fact that the institutions are functioning and are in many cases engaged. In any event, what is required is not to change the tools, but to change the way we think about using them and the outcome that we wish to achieve with them - to change our method of using the tool and thus when and where necessary to change the organisation and the practice. As an example, consider the world of art. The Impressionists were trained as realists. They had the same paint brushes, the same palette, the same canvas and they looked at the same view, but the Impressionists had a completely different idea of the outcome. In information theory, they ordered the data differently. And they produced a compellingly different result. We, if we are to triumph in the wars of today have to learn to do the trick the Impressionists did in the world of art. And as you will see, I haven't chosen Impressionism by mistake. What I am arguing for is a similar shift in our institutions.

And the second reason that we must have this profound change in our understanding of the use of military force rather than in the first instance considering the tools and the equipments, also results from the shift from industrial war to war amongst the people. In industrial war we set out to achieve advantage, by having superior equipments in superior numbers. We knew, or had decided on the worst case opponent, and we matched our inventories accordingly. Tactically the way these means were used was always important, as it was occasionally at theatre level. But in war amongst the people, where the opponent is form-less, operating deliberately below the threshold of the utility of our equipments as we want to use them, and using them amongst the people and with objectives to do with altering the intentions, rather than with destruction, the way we use our equipment is a strategic act, as well as a

tactical one. Now to those students of Clausewitz of which I'm sure there are many in this room and I apologise if I am having to assume knowledge in amongst the others. We recognise that Clausewitz said that the triumph in a fight...to triumph in a fight, it was a product of the trial of strength and the clash of wills – a product - of those two characteristics. And consider a football match or a boxing bout, or anything like that. There are two more or less equally matched sides. It becomes a trial of strength and that clash of wills. But if either one of those comes to zero, it's nothing. You've lost.

Now, instead of industrial war, in which the opponents set out with a primary objective, to win that trial of strength, devoting all their forces and resources to destroying the opponent's capability to resist, and thereby win the clash of wills, we have now war amongst the people. War amongst the people in which the primary objective is to win the clash of wills. In industrial war, the opponents seek to resolve the political confrontation that was its cause directly, by force of arms. The objectives for the use of military force, are hard and simple. Words like 'take', 'hold', 'destroy', 'defeat', 'annihilate' are used. They all describe the desirable outcome of a trial of strength. In war amongst the people the objectives are malleable and complex. They describe a condition which enables intentions to be changed or formed by other means. A current example, in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the words are used 'to create a safe and secure environment'. In war amongst the people military force does not resolve the confrontation directly. The conflicts or forceful acts contribute to one or other's side's efforts to win the clash of wills – to capture the will of the people, or at the very least, to neutralise it and thus work towards deciding the confrontation to advantage. Now I said that we are in this world of confrontations and conflicts, and I'll try and explain what I mean by these words. And I do not use them as synonyms, although much of our press - does.

A confrontation occurs, when two or more bodies, in broadly the same circumstances are pursuing different outcomes. Political affairs of all stripes national and international are about resolving confrontations. But when one or both sides cannot get their way and will not accept the alternative outcome, they sometimes seek to use military force to get it. They turn to conflict. And with industrial war we sought to resolve the matter by conflict. War was decisive strategically. But not now.

In adopting conflict, as the course of action, the side that is weak if it is wise, does not play to the opponent's strength, but rather follows the path of the guerrilla or the terrorist, avoiding set battle except on his own terms, and the operationally or

strategically decisive engagement so as not to present the stronger opponent with the chance to deliver the mortal blow. He follows a generic strategy composed of three strands and I will explain these at question time if anyone wants me to. The three strands are the propaganda of the deed, the strategy of provocation, and of the erosion of the will. And he does this so as to advance his position in the overall confrontation. Or else, he seeks to replicate that strength - like Iran, or North Korea, and possibly others - and develop nuclear weapons while following that same generic strategy. And this leads to the consequence that we see all about us that conflict occurs but its effects are usually only tactical. Very occasionally you get a theatre-level effect but in some, force, however forceful it looks, achieves only sub-strategic goals.

Now if you are very strong and have nuclear weapons you have too much to lose in using them. But whether you have them or not you have to find a way to exert your power. To use your strength, which is more than just your military forces. For as the philosopher Michel Foucault said, power is a relationship, not a possession. Finding the way to establish that relationship to advantage is the strategic question of our time. How, and to what end, do we apply force sub-strategically, in the conflict, so as to gain our strategic and political position in the overall confrontation and prevent our opponent from doing likewise? Or put another way, how do we avoid the observable phenomena of being able to win every fight but to lose the war? How and in what way and with what means do we translate these tactical successes into a strategic success? And I put it to you that our institutions of governance have failed to find the answer.

Now this form of war – war amongst the people – has six defining characteristics. And although I'm going to describe them to you in a list, I can't do it any other way – I would like you to understand them as being written in a circle and each one plays on the other five. And they are all dependent upon the circumstances of that particular confrontation for the weight you must give to each characteristic. Nevertheless they define war amongst the people.

The first trend I've started to discuss already. The ends, for which we employ or deploy military force, are changing from the hard objectives of industrial war to those malleable objectives of changing intentions. Objectives to establish a condition, in which other measures can achieve the desired outcome of forming or changing the opponent's intentions. For example, the Korean War started in 1948 when we changed our intentions, when China intervened, because to do otherwise was to use

the atomic bomb. And we settled on a divided career on almost the same line the war had started on, which incidentally is where the Second World War in that part of the world had finished. And we're still there in confrontation with the conflict unresolved. It just looks as though it's nuclear at the moment, and with a bit of luck and hope is about to de-nuclearise. The Cold War, we called it a war and we thought we might be having to go to war but we didn't. We changed the intentions of the people. We didn't change the intentions of their leaders. First the peoples of the Western satellites of the Soviet Empire changed their minds and changed their leaders and then the people of Russia did. It was a confrontation, not a conflict. Or about deterrence. That's to change someone's intentions, not to destroy him. The Yom Kippur War, when Sadat's objective was to create a condition by military force in which the confrontation between Egypt and Israel over the Sinai could be resolved to his advantage. And that's as good a reason to explain the intelligence failure as I know of. Bosnia, Kosovo and now Afghanistan and Iraq, all give examples regardless of the rhetoric at the time of the military being used to establish a condition usually expressed, as I've said as something like 'a safe and secure environment', rather than to resolve the confrontation.

And now let's look at the events of a year ago.

What were the ends or objectives of Hezbollah and Israel? Hezbollah is said to have initiated the conflict either separately or in sum, to take prisoners to bargain with - a tactical act to improve one's position in a conflict. Indeed, Nazrallah, the Hezbollah leader, had been saying that he would do this for about a year so as to recover some of the men taken and convicted by Israel. He is quoted as saying after they had taken the two prisoners 'no military operation will return the Israeli captured soldiers. The prisoners will not be returned, except through one way - indirect negotiations and a trade of prisoners'. He is also or Hezbollah is also said to have done this to draw Israel into an attack on Lebanon, a condition to enhance Hezbollah's position in Lebanon by showing they could defend successfully against Israel and / or to improve their position viz a viz Hamas, who were doing the same thing down in Gaza, and / or to further the Iranian and Syrian objectives in their confrontations with Israel and the United States.

In all cases, Hezbollah is using military force to establish a condition to advantage, not to achieve a strategic result directly. Israel on the other hand, declared the attack by Hezbollah's military wing as an act of war and promised Lebanon a very

painful and far-reaching response. In short, they saw themselves not at war with the State of Lebanon itself but with the non-state actor Hezbollah *in* Lebanon. However they wanted the Lebanese government to take responsibility for Hezbollah and to control what went on in their state. The Cabinet authorised severe and harsh retaliation on Lebanon and the Chief of Staff said ‘If the soldiers are not returned, we will turn Lebanon’s clock back 20 years.’

A former commander, who I understand to have been briefed to say he was on the inside – he was a former commander, let’s put it that way – said ‘Israel is attempting to create a rift between the Lebanese population and Hezbollah’s supporters by exacting a heavy price from the elite in Beirut’. The message is ‘If you want your air conditioning to work and if you want to be able to fly to Paris for shopping you must pull your head out of the sand and take action towards shutting down Hezbollah.’

In all of these we can see that they too were setting conditional objectives, namely to get the Lebanese to deal with Hezbollah. However, these pronouncements were accompanied by others that were couched in the hard terms of industrial war to destroy Hezbollah and to defeat the rocket attacks which gave an early hint that there might be divided counsel, in Tel Aviv. But as events unfolded the Lebanese were seen by Tel Aviv to be powerless. The rockets still fell on Israel’s towns and Hezbollah fought on. And these objectives were adjusted to the conditional objectives of gaining a viable internationally guaranteed buffer zone, a better position in the bargaining for prisoners and re-establishing the deterrent effect of the IDF. And perhaps now you can see why I have called the objectives of ‘War amongst the people’ malleable.

I give this range of examples to show that this trend has existed for a long time and in most cases forces may be deployed strategically but it is used or employed sub-strategically. The next trend is that we tend to carry out these actions in multinational groupings or in non-state groupings. We the good guys tend to be in the former and the bad guys tend to be in the latter. But these current issues needn’t be the formal ones like the NATO Alliance, or the United Nations or the Coalition in Iraq today. But they are often, and particularly in the theatre of operations, informal. And include in effect other agencies such as the OSCE or non-governmental organisations like UNHCR, Oxfam, or Medcins Sans Frontiere. And then of course you can have local actors as part of your informal alliance such as the Iraqi Security Forces, or the Afghan Security Forces. Or more dangerously you find yourself for short term gain,

dining with the devil and you make alliances with the Northern Alliance in as we bombed and bribed our way into Kabul, because we needed somebody on the ground to take advantage of our bombs. And the same occurred with the Kosovo Liberation Army in the bombing of Kosovo at the turn of the century.

And then of course we have the non-state actors, Hezbollah, Hamas, ETA, IRA, the Taliban, Al Qaeda, etc, etc. The obvious example from Lebanon is that Hezbollah is a non-state actor and that Israel was attacking Hezbollah in and on Lebanese territory and killing Lebanese people and destroying Lebanese property because Lebanon wasn't acting as a state. For sure Israel is a state and in large measure acting as one. But as I think you will see when we examine the other trends, it too was limited by this characteristic of engaging with a non-state actor. I won't go into it in huge detail but I can at question time if you wish, of analysing the tangle of the relationships that reached all the way to the United Nations and the Security Council and to the meetings of the G8 during those months of July and August. There was a US-UK-Israel vs. terror organisations generally and Iran in particular. Or Hezbollah, Iran and Syria, the European Allies and subsequently UNIFIL, a multinational force with contingents, each answering to different capitals. All of them, to one degree or another, and at one stage or another were actors and in some cases still are actors in that theatre of operations.

The third and most obvious trend is that war takes place amongst the people. Firstly the objective is the will of the people; secondly, the opponent often operating to the tenets of the guerrilla and the terrorist depends on the people for concealment, for support both moral and physical, and for information.

And thirdly the strategy of provocation and propaganda of the deed requires the people to be there for these strategies to work. But these conflicts take place amongst the people in another sense – in the media. Whoever coined the phrase 'The theatre of operations' was very prescient. Take it from me, who's stood there, as a theatre commander. You are now in these modern wars, these wars amongst the people, you are now standing there as the commander like a producer of some gladiatorial contest in some Roman circus. Only down there in the pit with you and your gladiators, is at least one other producer and his gladiators and you've got different scripts. And mixed up with you are all the people who are late for their seats, the fools who can't find their car park places, the ice cream sellers and the ticket touts. And they're all milling around where you are. And all around you in the stands is a

highly factional audience which pays attention to what's going on in the pit by looking at where it's noisiest, by peering through the drinking straw of their Coca Cola tins.

And your business as that theatre commander, as that producer is to wait and act and tell the most compelling story to the people in the stands. And if you can, you've won.

And the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel last summer, an event in a much longer and unresolved confrontation, took place amongst the people in both of the senses I've described. In Israel, the people in their houses, the towns and cities were manifestly the targets of the rocket attacks. And Israel, in attacking Hezbollah, operating amongst the people and in seeking to coerce the Lebanese people, hit Lebanese people and property, killing some 1,200 Lebanese and causing great damage to infrastructure and the displacement of over a million people. And in that theatre or circus, who had the most compelling narrative?

On balance and judging by the majority view it was probably Hezbollah, who with disciplined silence, and an uncommon lack of organisational ego, played to the generic strategy of the propaganda of the deed, where they were soon to stand up to the idea and have to be treated with, and with the strategy of provocation particularly within the context of the greater confrontation over the existence of Israel, they were able to cast themselves as the victims, or at least the representatives of the victims.

And a few weeks after the ceasefire, the economist declared on its front cover 'Nazrallah Rules. The war'. And 65% of Israelis in a poll at the same time wanted their Prime Minister to resign because of his handling of the war. Israel had not achieved its stated objectives and Hezbollah had maintained its attacks on the face of southern Lebanon in the face of the mighty idea and in the view of the Arab Street Hezbollah had done what should be done. But under the UN ceasefire, the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL were to operate on the border with Israel and prevent attacks across it. Hezbollah had lost its freedom of action in the south.

Criminal law, or treaty law, or international humanitarian law - How do we show that our actions are legitimate and those of our opponents are not?

The fourth trend is that war amongst the people is time-less. We set out to win industrial wars quickly because the whole of the society was involved, and we wanted to get back to peace and have a normal life like the Old Testament said. In our new circumstances it is more important to do things at the right time rather than two times.

Remember we're in the theatre. It's all about timing, not running to some staff officer's railway programme. The basic tactic is only to engage on one's own terms not today or on Tuesday, not when your opponent wants to but when it is to your advantage to do it safely. And when our military objectives are to seek set conditions in which other instruments of power are to resolve the matter, to resolve the confrontation, then we must maintain that condition until they have succeeded.

We are still in Korea, and Cyprus, and Kosovo and Lebanon. The rhetoric at the time at the initial engagement, based on concept of industrial war said otherwise, but the reality is we're still there. These are time-less because we have to maintain the condition until other means can be found to resolve the confrontation. As I've just said, the conflict in Lebanon last year is one in a long-running confrontation. What we probably don't remember, is how long forces under the United Nations flag have been deployed in Lebanon, let alone the region. The first 'I' in UNIFIL stands for 'interim'. They were deployed in 1978. How long is interim?

The fifth trend is that we fight to preserve the force. Now no commander wants to suffer any more casualties to his men and equipment that he has to. But in industrial war it was in the main, possible to replace your losses. We develop the production lines to do this. Conscription on the one hand, and defence industries on the other. And we had depots of kit and reserves in place. We are....These hardly exist any more and where they do it is extremely difficult to call upon them – particularly the manpower resources. We fight to preserve our forces for other reasons. We have to sustain the operations because they are timeless, because it isn't strategically decisive and we have to maintain the condition. And as an officer responsible for handling this side of life towards the end of my career, I developed what I call the 'Smith's Underpants Rule'. You have one on, one off, and one in the wash as an absolute minimum. So that any bright spark who suggested to me 'Oh, we only need a battalion to do that' I would say, 'You need three battalions as a minimum!' And you very quickly run out of British Army if you do that. The factor is actually rather higher than three, and is rather closer to five and ideally you want to push it even higher than that. But we won't go into the state of my underwear.

We fight not to lose the force for the same reason the guerrilla fights that way. It is expensive to acquire more, move them and prepare new men and equipment. And finally, politicians at home uncertain of the popularity of the venture wish to keep the

cost of men and materiel within what they judge to be politically sustainable in the circumstances. We can see this trend in the course of the conflict of last summer.

The cause of it was the taking of prisoners, the reaction, was to preserve the force. In industrial war, we all took prisoners. No one had a fight about recapturing prisoners. Think of it! There's a whole genre of literature about prisoners of war camps and what you know escaping from them and doing all that sort of thing. Now, now, we actually go to war for two men, and why not? But, understand that's a different thing to what we used to do. Two men were the small change of industrial war. And while I don't know enough about the internal workings of Hezbollah, Israel was extremely cautious when it came to conducting land operations, particularly after the initial follow-up to the raid that took the prisoners, lost a tank, its crew, and a number of other soldiers.

We can also see that fighting to preserve the forces is not the same as avoiding casualties. People are killed in large numbers where the fighting took place. And as I've said, the figures are far from reliable, but something in the order of 1,000 Lebanese are killed. And somewhere between 250 and 500 Hezbollah fighters are killed. In Israel, 120 soldiers and police are killed and some 44 civilians, showing the value of a well prepared civil defence and the relative inefficiency of the unguided rocket, as a weapon.

The 6th and final trend is that new uses are being found for weapons and organisations, acquired and developed for different purposes. Now I'm not arguing for one minute that a commander should not adapt his force to the circumstances. He should. That's what he's paid for. But if we look at the use of some of our weapons, they're not being used for the purpose or in the way they were intended to be. And if we're not using our weapons in this way, then something must have changed.

What is happening is that our opponents are operating below the threshold of the utility of our forces, as we would wish to use them. They are deliberately doing this. It is a deliberate decision by a thinking enemy. He will not give us the opportunity to use our potential strength. And when we try to use our strength in the way of industrial war, we play to his position, in his generic strategy of provocation and propaganda of the deed, and the conflict of last summer gives examples of this.

Israel's use of its reserves is another case in point. The main weight of the initial response was with the air and artillery strikes. And ground operations of any size, a company or two, were not mounted for about 10 days. And these operations

were directed towards Hezbollah strongholds and were intended to prevent rockets from being fired from these areas. Hezbollah were in well prepared positions and ready for a fight. By this stage reserve units were being called up and these units were trained, organised and equipped for armoured manoeuvre. But they were receiving orders to achieve objectives to do with stopping the rocket attacks, while avoiding civilian casualties. And it seems that commanders and their staffs lacked the language to explain what was required in terms that the reservists could understand and were trained for. Eventually and slowly, because the call-up process was found to be inefficient, the Israelis built up a sufficient force to conduct a general advance to the River Litani which got under way, some 3 days before the ceasefire was called.

Hezbollah's use of the katyusha rocket is another example and also an example of operating below the threshold of the utility of Israel's weapon systems. This aerial weapon was originally designed by Russia for the general support of an attacking ground force to thicken up its artillery barrage from a distance with an easily transportable system suitable for movement with bulk logistic handling systems so as to be fired in large numbers in a short period – an evident requirement if you're conducting industrial war.

Last year we saw it being used undefeated as a surrogate air force against a population a few at a time from concealed storage sites on a 'shoot and scoot' basis. And for all its inaccuracy and small warhead, its inefficiency, it was an effective weapon in the circumstances.

Please note that in spelling out these characteristics I have not said that there will not be big fights. Indeed the examples I gave at the beginning have plenty of examples of big battles. Nor have I said that these fights will not be in support of the achievement of objectives to do with state sovereignty. I am saying however that force will not achieve this directly or strategically. It may, if used well, establish conditions in which the objective is achieved by other means. And I am not suggesting that battle is in any way less awful than it ever was.

So to finish, 'What is to be done?'

The single most important thing is to change the way we think about the use of military force. To recognise the change in paradigm and that our institutional mind sets, developed and honed during years of industrial war, need to change. Force has utility. If it doesn't, why are we so concerned about terrorist groups, the spread of nuclear weapons and so on? Why is it that our opponents appear to understand the

utility of force, rather better than we do? How do we bring our military forces to bear with advantage?

We need to understand the outcome desired in the overall confrontation as being one of imposing ones will, of changing intentions and then to choose the objectives that support the achievement of that confrontational goal. To establish which of these objectives are to be achieved by military force and with what priority, and from this understanding of the relationship between the confrontation and the conflict, form the driving logic to direct the operation as a whole, so that all the leaders of power, such as diplomacy economy and so on, can be brought to bear coherently, and supported by the use of military force. And I underline supported.

To respect one's opponent as a thinking proactive enemy bent on imposing his will. You don't have to agree with him, you don't have to like him, but it pays to respect him. To understand that while the currency of the conflict the fight remains fire power that of the confrontation is information – that theatre. It is in that theatre, it is with information, that you change people's minds. We must learn to act in the view and the hearing of the parties to the confrontation and to those observing it, so that it is our narrative, it is our story that they believe is the correct one. The one that they follow. We must dictate the narrative. We must learn to operate so as to dislocate the opponent's military actions in the conflict from his measures, to achieve his confrontational objectives while maintaining that essential linkage in our own.

So holding these in mind, here are my master questions of those engaged in confrontations on Israel's northern border. I could have asked them a year ago and this might be one way of interpreting the events of the last year and looking into the future. It might explain some of the assassinations, fighting, bombing and political and diplomatic squabbles of the last 12 months as people search for the answers to these questions.

Can Israel convert their apparent loss into a win? After all they have an internationally guaranteed buffer zone. Hezbollah cannot operate as they did before in the south of Lebanon, and the government of Lebanon is now sovereign in its territory. And Hezbollah lost a lot of men and materiel. How is this done best so as to enhance Israel's position in its other confrontations, on its other borders?

Can Hezbollah avoid becoming the loser? Can it avoid being blamed by the rest of Lebanon? Will the remainder of Lebanon share side with them? Will Syria and

Iran continue to back them, and to the same degree? Can the government of Lebanon establish a dominant relationship with Hezbollah?

Can UNIFIL collaborate with Lebanon to secure the border? If the relationship between Hezbollah and Lebanon breaks down or is dominated by Hezbollah, can UNIFIL swing the balance in Lebanon's favour? And if it breaks down, what is UNIFIL's role? And depending on the party in question, both of the last question and all of the ones before, what is the role of military force and in combination with what other measures to achieve objectives that best serves its purpose in these confrontations? And as I suggest you can see this being played out in the last 12 months and it's got a long way to go yet.

Until the shift from the model of industrial war to that of war amongst the people is recognised at these political and strategic levels, and we think about the use of military force accordingly, we will not change our institutions so as to be able to achieve our purpose in our world of continual confrontations in which these conflicts nest. And more particularly, Israel will not rest in peace.

And I am happy to take questions as I say, as widely as you like.

(Applause)

Ladies and gentlemen before the General starts taking questions I'd just like to inform you that tonight's event is being recorded and so we will have wireless microphones and we would ask those of you who are going to pose the question, to state your name first before you ask the question.

GSRS: Fire away.

My name is Carol Gould and I write for 'Current Viewpoint' in Washington and London. Professors Mearsheimer and Wald are getting a lot of big audiences in America and around the world because of originally their article in the London Review of Books has now become a book about the - what they regard is the undue support for Israel by the United States. Do you think organisations like Hezbollah and these other terrorist organisations are really seeing Israel as a kind of satellite of the US? And what would happen if some President came into power who decided 'I'm not going to support the 'Israel Lobby' any more. Militarily, how do you think this would affect Israel's strategic position?

GSRS: I don't think they see Israel as a satellite of the United States in quite that simplistic way, no. Israel is Israel in their eyes. There's a whole baggage of history there which doesn't – you know it starts long before the United States. So... but the particularly the events since 2001 have made in the eyes of – we'll call it the Arab Street for speed and simplicity but I'm over-simplifying – see America, the United States as party to events in the middle East generally in a way that they did not see them in that role before. And so you do get yes, now there is a locking together but I think though you have to see this as a series of steps rather than the beginnings of the whole thing. I don't think it affects Israel and its security directly. I think it has very largely damaged the United States' ability to intervene and be seen to intervene in any impartial way at all. It is now seen as an actor in this game as opposed to the umpire or a referee and that if you like is damage to Israel in that I don't see a solution as it were brokered from outside as easily as perhaps one could have argued that the possibility was there - for the sake of a date - in the middle 90s. Is that enough of a...?

GSRS: Yes?

Brian Goldfarb. Do you see any signs of a change in Israel's likely response or the method of response as you discussed given that Ehud Barak has become Minister of Defence and by his own admission his experience of what we might call as a participant, low intensity conflict as has been said in interviews on television?

GSRS: I'm...I do think there'll be a change, because our boys are quick learners. They're not going to get it wrong just by repetition. They may get it wrong the next time too but it won't be – it'll be for want of trying to get it right. I'm not convinced the institutional change of thinking has occurred. On the other hand and to put in the scales against that last remark, at the events of the attack into this target in Syria, the very fact that there has been this enormous silence from Syria and so forth tells me that you know someone's been got bang to rights and I have...that shows a degree of precision, not in the attack so much although that clearly occurred, but in the thinking and the use of the tool which I find an encouraging sign. Now what I don't know and I don't suspect we should know is just how that's been keyed together with other measures taking place on other stages. The sort of thing I'm talking about as to how

you should use military force – that would be an example – where there's a clear beginning, middle and end. And you're not dragged in into one of these engagements where you're constantly held. If you want an example, just to expand as it were on the talk rather than your question. If you look at the operations into Sierra Leone by British Forces now we're I think it is 2001, 2002. There is another example. There is a clearly defined military objective, they go in and do it, they come out again. It takes 3 or 4 months. It's not a one night job, but there's a result at the end and they've got all the measures in place to improve the government and so on and so forth afterwards. So you actually use the result you've achieved by military force immediately with your other measures. And I'm not sure Israel's there yet.

GSRS: The question is you mustn't look at me until you've got the microphone. You need to look at the chaps with the microphones.

Sorry...Brian Warburn. Really two things. First of all how far do you feel...how far do feel that the increase in individual fire power the fact that you know a man with a camel and a high guided missile could stop a tank very easily, have affected the change in warfare that you're talking about? And how far do you feel that the changed objective of war includes simply making life impossible for other people even if your lot suffer as well? And how far is this a generalised objective among terrorist groups?

GSRS: The weight of bar and the amount of protection broadly move in cycles and you disperse. You don't mass in the same way so that the... the effect of the heavy weight of fire people spread out more, have heavier vehicles and so on. So broadly there's a...an advantage on one side or the other and it goes up, but I don't think that's changed it so much. And with all the weapons that we're using today have been, except for these things called improvised explosive devices, are the product of industrial war manufacture and all the rest of it. Making life miserable is an objective. It's an... Now at its most extreme, and if you take some Stalin-esque program, you kill everybody or deport them and I've solved my problem. But short of doing that, you set out in many cases to make life sufficiently difficult that someone has to pay attention to you. Now, calibrating that is interestingly difficult. And in the great theatre that I describe you're not only dealing with the people you're trying to make it unpleasant for in the pit. This is an observable activity. So this has to be approved of

by the people in the pits - or sorry, in the stands – or ignored. And the whole of the understanding of the strategies of provocation, propaganda of the deed and erosion of will, is all about doing these things so as to try and separate the people from the side that's opposed to you. Now if you can create a situation, where for example, if the security forces now make life so unpleasant on the streets of London that this is affecting your business, making life unpleasant, etc, etc. The erosion of will begins to play and you might just start feeling that you know 'Smiths the problem, not the hooligan element down the road'. And it very much depends how you play in that theatre. And once you start to feel that the price in amongst those people of this endeavour isn't worth it they start to separate and you have an example of the people in the United States and their government and their army, over Vietnam, where after the Tet Offensive and after that, slowly but surely the people of the United States turned against their government's desire and changed their government's intentions about prosecuting that war. And that wasn't by direct attack of the North Vietnamese on the people but it amounted to the same thing in terms of the theatre. And Israel is attempting to do that to the Lebanese saying 'It's going to be very unpleasant for you until you sort out Hezbollah'. And so...But then you get all the outsiders looking in start crying 'Fowl!' International humanitarian law, 'Fowl!' And this is why I say, our institutions are unsuited to understand how to handle this, while it seems that our enemies are a great deal cleverer at it. Is that enough of a...? It's rather a long answer but...

It's very interesting. Thank you.

GSRs: I need someone...you've got one...go ahead.

What do you think the implications and reaction of Israel are likely to be to the fact that longer range missiles are now being used against her? And do you think that the fact that the November Conference is in place, is likely to restrain any military response at this stage?

I'm sorry which conference?

The November Conference, the sort of quartet and...

GSRs: Ah. I'm not sure that has restrained Israel if Israel's felt its existential... its existence is at stake. The prospect of long range missiles is going to be extremely difficult. And although Israel has them now to contend with, this is not a prospect anybody should ignore. These are relatively...forget the warhead for a moment. The actual technology is as old as the B2 and we've gone a long way since then. And there's the use of such things as relatively easy and they are relatively difficult when used like those Katyusha to track down and get hold of. Look how difficult it was to shut down the Scuds which were only B weapons in modern dress in 1991. And they're not easy to defeat when they're in the air either. The higher they go, the longer the range, the more time you've got is basically... and there you get a better chance. This... we need to attend and understand this and the problem Israel has is that as anyone will, is finding these things to hit them before they're coming to you. And that is difficult to do and not for nothing Israel has missile...an anti-missile system which is unique to Israel but it's also way ahead of many other local area...I mean you wouldn't fit the United States, it's too big an area and so forth, but Israel's is well ahead of anybody else's.

My name's Robert Frank. I'm not quite clear whether you think that people's war is replacing industrial war and if it is, does it mean that a lot of the industrial armaments that we are building are not suitable for present and future time? Or are we going to have to cope with both kinds?

GSRs: I want you to distinguish...let's start again. Yes. Industrial war has gone. War amongst the people is what we do. But note I am not talking about the size or awfulness of the actual fight. It is the utility of the force that you've used. What it is you achieve as a result of winning that fight, that's changed. So if you go – let's take an example – If you go to Afghanistan or Iraq you will not...although there are thousands of troops - there are something like 160,000 United States troops in Iraq alone, nobody is handling that force as a force. The fights it has are all done 100, perhaps 150 men, supported by some air power. It's a melange of little fights that have been managed rather than orchestrated amongst the people. And we have no way of orchestrating them with all the other agencies of the past so those little fights become a whole. And the same in Afghanistan. And the same last year on the border.

The fight's not changing. Now, I am the first to say that we will need in time to reorganise our modern kit and most of our modern kit is over-specialised - a battle tank is 70 tonnes. As it grinds down that road it collapses every sewer, it breaks all everything down, it knocks down the power lines and so forth. You are wrecking the infrastructure on which the people depend! Now are you deliberately doing this to piss them off or are you trying to win their...? Therefore you've got to think again about some of these things.

MH: I'm afraid we only have time for one more question.

My name is George Hocksana. I want to ask you whether you can give us an example where the will of the opponent has been prominently and successfully been broken in a battle of the peoples?

GSRS: Whether you start me again I am being passed a bit of paper which I'm trying to read and failing to do so.

Whether you can give us an example of a situation where in a battle of peoples the will of one of the contenders has permanently and successfully been broken?

GSRS: What you're trying to do is create a condition in which you capture their will. I would suggest that the - a quick and fairly clear example is the Malayan insurgencies in the Colonial era. Now there was a lot in favour of the British forces at that time and there isn't something that anybody would say we should copy and just carry into the future. But that changed the will of the people and the Communist terrorists were defeated and the final remnants went up into on the border with Thailand and stayed there into their old age. Another one would be the confrontation in Borneo between Indonesia and the British forces as to whether that bit of Borneo that's Malaya, was Malaya or not. Again the Indonesians eventually backed off and never tried those - that adventure again. A third would be Rhodesia. Where the Rhodesians completely failed. They won every fight comprehensively. There wasn't a single skirmish that they lost. But they failed in every respect to capture the will or retain the will of the population who slowly but surely rallied to the liberation cause as their narrative

would have it. And we can see what's happening now in Zimbabwe. And those three examples from my...that I've been involved with.

MH: I'm sure there are a lot more questions in the audience and we could go on for quite some time. We are restrained not by the General, I should say, but actually by the people who manage the building. So at this juncture I would like to ask vote of thanks and if Michael you'd be kind enough...

Michael Newman: Ladies and gentlemen. Before the () thanks I'd like to take up two points of detail. One is something which the Chairman said in his speech. He talked about high brow and high powered committees. Now I'm quite sure that high brow and high powered are very different things and that a high powered committee is very often not a high brow one, but that's another matter. The other point is when the General mentioned that the war with Hezbollah – war arose over 2 people and that this was a very small (). My wife has reminded me that there was once a war which took place over somebody's ear...Jacob's ear if you remember rightly.

To move to the main thrust of the discussion. Sir Rupert's general views are I think well known. He has published in various ways quite a lot. And I think many people have for some considerable time begun to think along similar lines. But what we've heard tonight was most interesting and stimulating expose cogent and penetrating was the logic underlying Sir Rupert's position. Two particular points struck me. One is the timelessness of war. Sir Rupert gave examples of troops going in and not coming out. I remember thinking when the operation at Suez began 'How are they going to get them out again?' And of course we did get out, but with some considerable degree of ignominy. And now the thing is the so-called 'War on terrorism'. How are we going to know when a terrorist thinks it begins, and how will we know when it ends? I don't know.

The second point was the need for flexibility. That has been there for some time. Sir Rupert mentioned the importance of making life unpleasant, in this case for the Lebanese who are host to the Hezbollah. But when Wellington invaded France at the end of his Peninsular campaign he took great care not to upset the French farmers, to make life as easy for them as he could, to pay for what he bought, and as a result the French farmers became great supporters of Wellington. And in Malaya of which I did happen to have some experience. I'm sorry that Sir Rupert has stolen my thunder;

we did in fact employ weapons very flexibly. We denied the terrorists their access to food. We used artillery not to destroy them but to keep them on the move, and to deny them sleep. And as Sir Rupert said, it all ended very successfully. As far as Israel is concerned I think it's a special case because the Israelis are so fed up with being castigated by all and sundry that I don't think they care very much what people think about them. And of course that does in a way have a very liberating effect. I don't think there is much I can usefully add except to thank Sir Rupert once again, for opening our minds to the huge complexity and variety and difficulty of tracing these strands in the theatre which he aptly described as the (theatre) of war. Sir Rupert, thank you very much.

(Applause)